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The Ultra Syndrome: did it hamper the search for flight MH370? 
Abstract 
Ultra was the Allies' name for highly classified intelligence information obtained during World War Two by 
breaking encrypted enemy radio communications. “It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war,” Winston 
Churchill is reported to have told King George VI. 
Much German radio traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine, many codes of which the British could 
decipher. The downside was that military commanders sometimes could not act on Ultra intelligence 
because it might give away to the Germans that the Allies had access to Enigma traffic. 
For example, during the Battle of Crete in 1941, the Allied commander on the island, New Zealand’s 
General Freyberg, did not move troops away from defending coastal areas despite Ultra intercepts 
indicating that a seaborne attack was improbable and an airborne invasion most likely. Freyberg alone 
had Ultra access but he did not act on it lest it reveal to the Germans that he knew their intentions. This 
led ultimately to the fall of Crete 
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Countries' anxiety about revealing their intelligence capabilities makes them loath to share 
the results of surveillance even for life-and-death searches. AAP/NEWZULU/Zaki Zulfadhli  
Ultra was the Allies' name for highly classified intelligence information obtained during 
World War Two by breaking encrypted enemy radio communications. “It was thanks to Ultra 
that we won the war,” Winston Churchill is reported to have told King George VI. 
Much German radio traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine, many codes of which the 
British could decipher. The downside was that military commanders sometimes could not act 
on Ultra intelligence because it might give away to the Germans that the Allies had access to 
Enigma traffic. 
For example, during the Battle of Crete in 1941, the Allied commander on the island, New 
Zealand’s General Freyberg, did not move troops away from defending coastal areas despite 
Ultra intercepts indicating that a seaborne attack was improbable and an airborne invasion 
most likely. Freyberg alone had Ultra access but he did not act on it lest it reveal to the 
Germans that he knew their intentions. This led ultimately to the fall of Crete. 
Slow to share on MH370 
Much in accounts of the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 suggests that what might 
be called the Ultra Syndrome has been a factor. Quite simply, countries with access to 
sensitive surveillance information helpful to the search have been reluctant to reveal that data 
because it might give away their capabilities. Thailand has already admitted it had 
surveillance information that it did not share, at least initially, with Malaysia. 
The Allies were willing to lose Crete rather than alert 
the Germans that their Enigma code had been cracked. AAP/Keir David  
The Ultra Syndrome may also have been at work closer to home. While the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has not confirmed the origins of its information about 
debris in the Southern Ocean, it seems likely that a US military satellite was the source. 
AMSA’s spokesman has revealed that the satellite photos were taken several days earlier. 
This begs the question: how long was that information available? And why was the search 
suddenly focused on an area of the Southern Ocean far from previous search areas? It may be 
argued that this was the limit of the aircraft’s fuel endurance along the southern corridor of its 
possible flight, but it was more likely in response to some, as yet unconfirmed, source of 
intelligence. 
US surveillance data is highly classified and passed to only a very limited number of 
countries, including Australia. Any early release of such data would say a lot about US 
surveillance capabilities. As Fairfax journalist Peter Hartcher observed: 
Australian officialdom is hyper-protective of US intelligence and its sources - even more 
protective than the Americans themselves … It’s a symptom of the Australian defence 
establishment’s mentality as an anxious junior ally, afraid of giving its senior partner any 
reason to curtail the flow of intelligence. 
A record of information lapses 
Australia has a past record of the Ultra Syndrome with our border protection arrangements. 
Over the years, there have been repeated breakdowns in communications between 
intelligence agencies and the wider border protection organisation (Coastwatch) and search 
and rescue authority. Intelligence relevant to the task in hand was not released to the latter 
agencies because no one in those agencies held the necessary security clearances. 
While this problem has been overcome, including by embedding appropriately cleared 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers in Border Protection Command, lives have been 
lost through the failure of Australian agencies to coordinate effectively. The Ultra Syndrome 
lost these lives. 
Militaries and intelligence agencies have a marked tendency to over-classify information and 
be protective of their sources. Navies talk a lot about maritime cooperation and the 
importance of information-sharing but there are major limitations to what they are prepared 
to do and share together. Some countries and navies have the reputation of being “vacuum 
cleaners”: they suck in information but give nothing out. 
The vexed issue for policymakers is deciding when national security concerns should give 
way to saving human lives. When the dust settles on the MH370 saga, a positive outcome 
may well be that countries become less sensitive to sharing surveillance information 
important to effective search and rescue missions. 
The two international agencies concerned, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and 
the International Maritime Organisation, should at least address the issue. 
 
